Abstract. The quantum measurement problem has led some physicists and philosophers of physics to speculate concerning the relationship between physical and mental states. We will consider the sense in which this relationship provides a degree of freedom that is tempting to use in addressing the measurement problem. In short, in a collapse formulation of quantum mechanics, a strong variety of mind-body dualism provides a natural criterion for when collapses occur, and in a no-collapse formulation of quantum mechanics, a strong variety of dualism provides a way to account for an observer's determinate experience even when her physical state fails to specify a determinate measurement record. We will also consider options for avoiding a commitment to at least mind-body dualism.
Quantum measurement and the temptation of dualism
The quantum measurement problem is arguably the most difficult conceptual problem in the foundations of physics. It is an indication of its difficulty that attempts to solve it have led physicists and philosophers of physics to speculate concerning the relationship between physical and mental states. We will consider the sense in which this relationship provides a degree of freedom that is tempting to use in addressing the measurement problem. We will start with Eugene Wigner's understanding of the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics.
Two years prior to being awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics, Wigner published a paper arguing that a consistent formulation of quantum mechanics requires one to endorse a strong variety of mind-body dualism. In particular, he argued:
Until not many years ago, the 'existence' of a mind or soul would . . . When the province of physical theory was extended to encompass microscopic phenomena, through the creation of quantum mechanics, the concept of consciousness came to the fore again: it was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a consistent way without reference to consciousness.
And continued:
Date: August 25, 2014.
quantum mechanics and dualism
It may be premature to believe that the present philosophy of quantum mechanics will remain a permanent feature of future physical theories; it will remain remarkable, in whatever way our future concepts may develop, that the very study of the external world led to the conclusion that the content of the consciousness is an ultimate reality (1961, .
To see why Wigner believed that quantum mechanics requires a commitment to a strong variety of mind-body dualism for its consistent formulation, one must understand the basic structure of the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics to which he was committed, and the quantum measurement problem.
We will start with the standard theory and the measurement problem, then consider Wigner's argument. We will then consider a fragment of an argument from an earlier letter from Wolfgang Pauli to Max Born. This line of argument will lead us to consider how even a no-collapse formulation of quantum mechanics may commit one to a strong physical-nonphysical dualism on plausible-sounding assumptions. The suggestion, however, will be that while it is tempting to commit to some form of dualism to address the measurement problem, there are viable options for avoiding a commitment to a strong mind-body dualism.
The standard formulation of quantum mechanics
The standard von Neumann-Dirac collapse formulation of quantum mechanics is based on four rules. There are two representational rules (1) representation of states: the state of a physical system S is represented by a vector ψ S of unit length, sometimes called the wave function, in a Hilbert space H and (2) representation of observables: every physical observable O is represented by a Hermitian operatorÔ on H, and every Hermitian operator on H corresponds to some observable. An interpretational rule (3) interpretation of states: a system S has a determinate value for observable O if and only if the system is in an eigenstate of the observableÔψ S = λψ S . And two dynamical laws (4a) deterministic linear dynamics: if no measurement is made, the system S evolves in a deterministic linear way: ψ(t 1 ) S =Û (t 0 , t 1 )ψ(t 0 ) S and (4b) random nonlinear collapse dynamics: if a measurement is made, the system S randomly, instantaneously, and nonlinearly jumps to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, where the probability of jumping to φ S when O is measured is |ψφ| 2 . The first dynamical law (4a) explains quantum interference effects, and the second (4b) ensures that measurements yield determinate outcomes and explains quantum probabilities.
The problem with this formulation of quantum mechanics is that while measurement occurs as an undefined primitive term in the theory, the two dynamicallaws typically give different predictions for the post-interaction state of a measuring device and its object system depending on whether one considers the device to be a physical system like any other or a collapse-causing observer. More specifically, if one treats an observer as a physical system like any other, then one should use rule 4a for the interaction between the observer and her object system; but if one takes the observer to be somehow special and capable of causing collapses, then one should use rule 4b for the interaction. And,since the two rules typical predict different states, one gets a logical contradiction if one tries to apply both. Further, and of particular importance to Wigner, there are also empirical consequences for when each rule is taken to apply-a point central to his friend story, which we will consider in the next section. So the standard formulation of quantum mechanics is either (1) logically inconsistent if one thinks that observers and other measuring devices are physical systems like any other or (2) incomplete in an empirically significant way if one does not know how to identify systems that should count as measuring devices. This is the quantum measurement problem.
Wigner's proposal
Wigner's proposal for solving the measurement problem was simple:
The important point is that the impression which one gains at an interaction may, and generally does, modify the probabilities with which one gains the various possible impressions at later interactions. In other words, the impression one gains at an interaction, called also the result of an observation, modifies the wave function of the system. . . . [I]t is the entering of an impression into our consciousness which alters the wave function because it modifies our appraisal of the probabilities for different impressions which we expect to receive in the future. It is at this point that the consciousness enters the theory unavoidably and unalterably (1961
172-3).
Importantly, while one might be tempted to read parts of this passage epistemically,
Wigner took the collapse that resulted from the entering of an impression into the observer's consciousness to be a real physical process. As the Wigner's friend story makes clear, he took there to be experiments one might perform, at least in principle, to determine what systems cause collapses. His solution to the measurement problem, then, was to stipulate, as a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics, that a real physical collapse of the state occurs whenever a conscious mind gains the impression of the measurement result.
There is, indeed, a sense in which Wigner's proposal immediately solves the measurement problem by sharpening rules 4a and 4b. The dynamical laws are now 3 quantum mechanics and dualism (4a') deterministic linear dynamics: if no conscious mind apprehends its state, the system S evolves in a deterministic linear way: ψ(t 1 ) S =Û (t 0 , t 1 )ψ(t 0 ) S and (4b') random nonlinear collapse dynamics: if a a conscious mind apprehends its state, the system S randomly, instantaneously, and nonlinearly jumps to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, where the probability of jumping to φ S when O is measured is |ψφ| 2 . If there is a simple determinate matter of fact concerning whether and when an impression enters into a consciousness, these sharpened rules provide a consistent specification for the quantum dynamics.
Wigner believed that this move was "required" for the consistency of the standard collapse theory, and he considered it to be the "simplest way out" of the quantum measurement problem (180). And, again, he took his specification of when collapses occur to have physical and empirical consequences. Namely, the state collapses caused by minds affect the quantum-mechanical states of physical systems and hence objective, observable properties of the physical world.
Wigner illustrated this with his friend story. Wigner's friend F has a measuring device M and both are ready to measure the x-spin of a spin-1/2 system S. The system S begins in the state
If we use the linear dynamics, rule 4a, and assuming ideal correlating interactions, after the measuring device M interacts with the object system S and after the F looks at the the pointer on the M , the composite system F + M + S will be in the
This state follows directly from the linearity of the dynamical law and the assumption that the interactions perfectly correlate the x-spin of S and F 's measurement record. By rule 3, this is a state where F has no determinate measurement record at all-indeed, he is in an entangled state with M and S here and hence does not even have a proper quantum-mechanical state of his own.
But if we use the nonlinear collapse dynamics, rule 4b, for the interaction between M and S, or for the interaction between M and F , or for when F 's mind apprehends the state, the composite system F + M + S will either be in the state
or in the state
each with equal probability 1/2. In contrast with state 2, each of these states describe F as having a determinate measurement result on the standard eigenvalueeigenstate link 3. In the first of these states, F determinately records the result "↑ x " and in the second he determinately records the result "↓ x ."
Wigner argued that the state of the composite system must be either state 3 or state 4. To begin, Wigner believed that were he to ask the friend what the result of his measurement was, the he would hear his friend say something perfectly determinate. Then, after having completed the whole experiment, if he asked his friend, "What did you feel about the result of your measurement before I ask you?", the friend would certainly reply, "I told you already, I got the result ["↑ x " or "↓ x "]" as the case may be. That is, the friend would report that the result of his measurement "was already decided in his mind" before Wigner asked him. He concludes this line of argument:
If we accept this, we are driven to the conclusion that the proper wave function immediately after the after the interaction of friend and object was already either [state ( While Wigner recognized that it is not logically inconsistent to deny that the friend is right in reporting that he already had a determinate measurement result before he was asked, Wigner took such an option to be unacceptable. He argued that to deny that the friend has the same sort of determinate experiences that we do and hence causes collapses of systems to determinate property states "is surely an unnatural attitude, approaching solipsism, and few people, in their hearts, will go along with it (1961,177-8). So it is when the friend apprehends the state, and not when Wigner asks him what his result was, that the composite system collapses to a state where the friend has a determinate and now accurate measurement record.
The precise sense in which such collapses involve a real physical process that produces in principle observable results was important for Wigner's argument. Consider an observableÂ of the composite system F + M + S that has
as an eigenstate with eigenvalue +1, and
as an eigenstate with eigenvalue −1. An observation ofÂ would yield the result +1 with probability 1 if the interactions between F , M , and S are linear, and it would yield the result +1 with probability 1/2 and the result −1 with probability 1/2 if 5 quantum mechanics and dualism mechanical state and rule 4a always correcting describing the time-evolution of the quantum state.
In particular, the following assumptions are sufficient to commit one to a strong variety of dualism:
• Assumption 1 (state completeness): The standard quantum-mechanical state provides a complete and accurate representation of the physical state.
• Assumption 2 (no collapse): The linear dynamics, rule 4a provides a complete and accurate description of the evolution of the physical state for all systems at all times.
• Assumption 3 (empirical consistency): If a system is initially in a superposition of states corresponding to different eigenvalues of the observable being measured, then it is possible for the measurement to yield a result corresponding to any of those eigenvalues.
• Assumption 4 (no branching): The measurement interaction between an observer and a physical system typically yields a single determinate measurement result. It is sometimes suggested that decoherence considerations might explain why there is a single determinate measurement record when the post-measurement state is one like (2) . Note, however, that linear interactions with the environment will simply entangle more systems with the state of the compost system F + M + S.
Hence such interactions will do nothing whatsoever to produce a physical state that describes a system with a single determinate measurement record. Rather, in order for the observer's complete state to describe a single determinate measurement record when such a post-measurement state obtains, one must add something to the physical description given by (2) that specifies the value of that record. On the assumption that (2) is the complete physical state, what one adds to get the observer's complete state all told will be a description of something nonphysical.
Given the four assumptions above, then, an observer's determinate measurement records must supervene on a nonphysical aspect of the observer's complete state.
Further, one might argue, for quantum mechanics to be empirically adequate, this aspect of the complete state must also be something to which the observer has epistemic access. The most direct way to ensure this would be to stipulate that the value of an observer's measurement outcome is determined by the observer's mental state, then make this state determinate. On this line of argument, one again ends up committed to a strong variety of mind-body dualism, strong because since the determinate outcome of the observer's measurement fails to supervene on her physical state.
One might have thought that starting with a no-collapse view would prevent one from having to say when collapses occur, as Wigner was required to do, and hence allow one to avoid a commitment to quantum dualism. But this is one half-right.
While one does not have the problem of saying when collapses occur, one does have the problem of saying how an observer can have a determinate measurement outcome without a collapse of the entangled superposition like (2) and providing something in the full state description on which the value of that outcome might supervene. The most direct way to get determinate records that are epistemically accessible is to add them as the experiential state of the observer, but if one one takes the quantum state to provide the observer's complete physical state, then one ends up committed to a strong mind-body dualism.
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Not only are the reason for the quantum dualisms different, there are also significant differences between the Wigner's type of dualism and the no-collapse dualism just described. Perhaps most salient is that, while minds cause collapses on Wigner's view, in the no-collapse dualism described, minds are just there to explain determinate measurement outcomes-they are just something on which determinate outcomes might supervene, and, as such, they need never affect physical states. Indeed, since the evolution of the physical state on a no-collapse theory is always given by the linear dynamics, which depends only on the physical state, there is a clear sense in which mental states cannot cause physical events here. The minds are just along for the ride following their own auxiliary dynamics, a dynamics that will be contingent on the evolution of the physical state. being sufficient to determine the measurement outcome. 9 None of these options is particularly attractive, and the last commits one to a physical-nonphysical dualism.
But if one is going to add something to the full state description, then one might deny state completeness and make it something physical, but something beyond the standard quantum state, that determines measurement outcomes.
Bohmian mechanics provides a concrete example for how to do precisely this.
On Bohm's theory, particle positions are always determinate, so, insofar as physical measurement records are determined by particle positions, measurement results are determinate as well. 10 More specifically, in the context of the Wigner's fiend story, the theory explains how the position of the particles that make up the pointer of the measuring device M end up associated with one or the other of the two possible measurement results represented in the state 2 and how this association provides the friend F with an effective measurement record that one can expect to be wellcorrelated with whatever actions F makes on the basis of the value of that record.
It also explains why one can expect such records to satisfy the standard quantum statistics. This is a long story involving a number of subtleties along the way, but since we know how to tell it, we know at least one concrete way to give up the state completeness assumption.
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Giving up the assumption of state completeness by adopting Bohmian mechanics, however, exchanges a strong physical-nonphysical dualism for a strong physicalphysical dualism where the evolution of the wave function is described by one dynamical law and the motion of particles by another and where the positions of the particles do not supervene on the standard quantum mechanical state. 12 Indeed, one might argue that the wave-function/particle-position dualism of Bohmian mechanics looks very like the mind-body dualism of Albert and Loewer's (1988) singlemind theory. On each of these theories, the quantum-mechanical state evolves linearly and the hidden variable that determines measurement outcomes, particle positions in Bohm's theory and mental states on Albert and Loewer's theory, obey an auxiliary dynamics and remain always determinate.
One might further argue that the strong physical-physical dualism of Bohm's theory has no virtues over a variety of strong-mind body dualism. But I do not 9 This is the strategy of the single-mind and many-minds formulation of quantum mechanics. See Albert and Loewer (1988) . 10 Bohmian mechanics needs the assumption determinate measurement outcomes supervene on determinate particle positions in the theory. While this is a plausible assumption given typical hamiltonians of interaction, it is also easy to say how such an assumption might fail. See, for example, Albert (1992) discussion of John 1 and 2.
think that is right. Rather, it seems to me that there is an important distinction to be made between the two types of theory regarding the sort of account of mental states each allows. In particular, while a strong mind-body dualism of the sort that we have been discussing simply precludes such an explanation, Bohm's theory allows one to continue to seek an explanation of mental states by considering how they might supervene on physical states.
Another candidate one might sacrifice to avoid quantum dualism is the nocollapse assumption. This is the assumption that the linear dynamics provides a complete and accurate description of the evolution of the physical state for all systems at all times. This assumption, of course, is violated by the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, it is precisely this that leads to the quantum measurement problem in the first place-if the standard theory did not have the two mutually incompatible dynamical laws, one would not face the embarrassment of having to say when each obtains. And, of course, it was in addressing the measurement problem that Wigner argued that an commitment to a strong variety of mind-body dualism is required. Hence, one does not automatically escape a commitment to quantum dualism by allowing for collapses.
That said, we do know how to allow for collapses of the state without committing to a physical-nonphysical dualism. Collapse formulations of quantum mechanics like GRW (1986) provide prescriptions for how and when collapses occur without in any way appealing to a physical-nonphysical distinction. The original version of GRW, for example, stipulates that, while each typically obeys the linear dynamics, every particle has a very small, but positive, probability per unit time of collapsing to a state close to an eigenstate of position. The effect of this stochastic term in the dynamics is that while microscopic objects involving few particle will likely behave linearly, macroscopic objects involving many particles whose positions are strongly correlated will likely have an approximately determinate center of mass and behave quasi-classically. There perhaps a sort of dualism at work here, but it is purely physical and involves only the dynamics.
That said, there are good reasons not to like collapse theories at all, and hence to keep the no-collapse assumption. To begin, there is strong empirical support for the linear dynamics insofar it has always made the right empirical predictions whenever we have been able to isolate and control a physical system well enough to test it.
Further, since it predicts the instantaneous collapse of specially extended systems, the collapse dynamics, as it stands, is incompatible with relativistic constraints.
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Concerning the empirical consistency assumption, it is unclear, at least to me, how one might sacrifice this on any empirically adequate formulation of quantum mechanics. This is the assumption that if a system is initially in a superposition of 13 See Barrett (2014) for a recent discussion.
states corresponding to different eigenvalues of the observable being measured, then it is possible for the measurement to yield a result corresponding to any of those eigenvalues. The thought is that this is simply required by our experience given the way that we assign quantum-mechanical states. Even in Bohmian mechanics, where one has a fully deterministic theory and particle position as the only observable noncontextual property, if a system is initially represented by an effective wave function corresponding to different eigenvalues of the (possibly contextual) observable being measured, then there is a positive epistemic probability of the measurement yielding the (possibly contextual) result corresponding to any of those eigenvalues. The upshot is that it is difficult to see how one could given this up and still have something that is recognizable as quantum mechanics. If one gives a concrete proposal for how to do it, then one might consider the potential costs and benefits of sacrificing it.
Finally, the no branching assumption holds that the measurement interaction between an observer and a physical system typically yields a single determinate measurement result. 14 While this may seem entirely uncontentious, this assumption is famously given up on at least some reconstructions of Everett's pure wave mechanics, theories like the many-worlds interpretation. 15 Giving it up, however, comes with significant costs. Particularly salient among these, if one allows for branching where a copy of the initial observer determinately gets a different measurement outcome on each branch, it is difficult to make sense of the standard quantum probabilities. Indeed, the probability of an observer getting each result is one insofar as one understands the observer as surviving the branching process at all, and this is not the statistical prediction one wants from quantum mechanics. Further, concerning the topic at hand, if one allows for branching, one avoids a strong physical-nonphysical dualism only to find oneself with a strong physical-physical pluralism of alternative branches, each with copies of the original observer.
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The upshot is that while one would face nontrivial costs giving up any of the assumptions that lead to physical-nonphysical dualism in the no-collapse argument, we know concretely how to give up at least three the four explicit assumptions.
That said, we have also seen that giving up one or more of these assumptions does not automatically prevent one from ending up committed to some variety of dualism by one's favored resolution to the measurement problem. I take strategic 14 The typically here is just supposed to cover the chance that something goes wrong with the measurement like the pointer breaking during the measurement yielding a state where one piece points at one result and the other at a different result. 15 See Barrett and Byrne (2012) for a description of Everett's own views, and Wallace (2012) and Saunders, Barrett, Kent, and Wallace (2010) for a recent discussions of the many-worlds interpretation. 16 For discussions of the possible metaphysical commitments of such an approach see Saunders, Barrett, Kent, and Wallace (2010) and the conceptual introduction in Barrett and Byrne (2012) .
considerations regarding theory choice and metaphysical commitment here to be a matter of cost-benefit analysis given one's predictive and explanatory values. The interesting discussion regards the details of the expiatory tradeoffs involved the the alternative options.
Discussion
On this view, the threat of a commitment to a strong variety of dualism in quantum mechanics ultimately results from competing explanatory demands. The linear dynamics is needed to explain interference effects. But it cannot, by itself, explain how a measurement interaction yields a single determinate measurement record. Hence, if one demands an explanation of determinate measurement records in terms of objective features of the world, then one must add something to the theory. It is this addition that threatens a commitment to some strong variety of dualism or metaphysical pluralism.
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One might add the collapse dynamics to get determinate measurement records.
But then one has a theory with two dynamical laws and one must clearly say when each obtains. And, as Wigner argued, given that one only wants or needs, a system's state to collapse when it is observed, a natural way to accomplish this is to stipulate that conscious observers cause collapses by dint of being conscious. This provided Wigner with principled distinction between systems that cause collapses and those that do not, and the determinateness of the observer's mental state on this view is never threatened by physical superposition. And one ends up committed to a strong variety of mind-body dualism.
But, as we have seen, one can also find oneself committed to a strong variety of mind-body dualism if one takes the standard quantum-mechanical state to provide a complete physical description and denies that there are ever collapses of the quantum mechanical state. If the linear dynamics always obtains but a measurement interaction typically yields just a single measurement result, then, since that single outcome cannot typically be represented by the superposed physical state, it must be represented by a nonphysical state. And since the outcome is meant to explain the observer's experience, it must be a nonphysical state on which the observer's experience supervenes.
The point here is not that quantum mechanics requires a commitment to a strong variety of mind-body dualism. Rather, there remain a number of other options on 17 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are approaches to quantum mechanics where one does not make this sort of realist explanatory demand. On Richard Healey's (2012) pragmatist mechanics, for example, state attribution is not directly representational of the physical state of a system, and, hence, one does not require an account of determinate measurement records in terms of attributed states. And one might not worry much about the dynamics since a quantum state represents something more like an agent's epistemic state than the physical state of a system on such a view.There are, of course, significant explanatory costs giving up on direct physical description. the table. While quantum mechanics does push toward some variety of pluralism, it need not be a physical-nonphysical dualism. Bohmian mechanics illustrates how one might add something physical to the quantum state to provide something on which determinate measurement records might supervene in a no-collapse theory.
One ends up on that account with a strong physical-physical dualism where one must specify both particle positions and the standard quantum state to characterize a physical system. And GRW-type spontaneous collapse theories illustrate how one might specify a single dynamical law that incorporates a sort of physical dualism in its sometimes linear and deterministic and other times nonlinear and stochastic dynamics. And in Bohmian mechanics and GRW, the sort of dualism involved is arguably much more modest than the sort of mind-body dualism required by Wigner's account or something like Albert and Loewer's single-mind theory. While mental states do not typically supervene on physical states in the latter theories, there is nothing in the structure of the former that would prevent this. Such formulations of quantum mechanics, then, exhibit the methodological virtue of not automatically precluding one from explaining mental states by describing how they supervene on physical states.
Whether a satisfactory resolution to the measurement problem should be taken to require some variety of mind-body dualism, physical-nonphysical dualism, or physical-physical dualism depends on the precise explanatory demands one places on quantum mechanics and on the background assumptions one finds plausible. My sense is that if a set of plausible-sounding assumptions commits one to a strong any sort of physical-nonphysical dualism where the nonphysical states do not supervene on the physical states, then one should sacrifice some of the plausible-sounding assumptions. The puzzle is what to sacrifice.
Given the options, I take the least objectionable to be either (1) sacrificing physical state completeness and adopting a hidden-variable theory like Bohmian mechanics hence opting for a physical-physical dualism or (2) sacrificing the requirement that the complete state determine a single measurement outcome and adopting something like Everett's pure wave mechanics. To be sure, each of these options comes with significant explanatory costs. 18 But quantum mechanics should be expected to requires one to sacrifice at least come of one's pre-theoretic intuitions.
